Public Access to Juvenile and Family Court: Should the Courtroom Doors Be Open or Closed? by Bazelon, Emily
Public Access to Juvenile and Family Court:
Should the Courtroom Doors Be Open or Closed?
Emily Bazelon'
INTRODUCTION
What role, if any, does the public have to play in the delinquency and
dependency proceedings that compose the dockets of juvenile and family
courts?' Since the establishment of the first juvenile court in Chicago in
1899, most jurisdictions have allowed only a small group of judges, law-
yers, probation officers, and social workers access to court proceedings
and records when children are either victims of abuse or accused of
crimes.2 Policies of non-disclosure for minors originated because the
founders of the juvenile court at the turn of the century believed confi-
dentiality was critical to rehabilitation and treatment. Only if children
escaped the stigma of public knowledge, the juvenile court founders rea-
soned, could they leave behind their troubled pasts.3
Despite a wave of doubt in the 1920s and again in the 1950s and 1960s
about whether the juvenile court could meet its rehabilitative goals, law-
makers and courts continued to assume the benefits of confidentiality in
f Yale Law School, J.D. expected 2000. I thank Judith Resnik for her valuable advice and
mentorship, and Robin Golden, Paul Sabin, Julie Becker, and Courtney Clark for their helpful
comments. I am grateful to my mother, Dr. Eileen Bazelon, for sparking my interest in child ad-
vocacy.
1. Jurisdiction over legal matters related to children varies widely. In some states, such as
California, juvenile court is the forum for both child abuse and neglect and juvenile crime pro-
ceedings. See CAL. R. OF CT. 1423. In other states, like New York, family court judges hear both
sets of proceedings. See, e.g., N.Y. CT. R. §§ 205.83, 205.20. See, e.g., Barbara A. Babb, Fashion-
ing an Interdisciplinary Framework for Court Reform in Family Law: A Blueprint To Construct a
Unified Family Court, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 469, 483-84 (1998).
2. I discuss both dependency and delinquency cases because the continuum from crime to
mistreatment makes it difficult to draw lines between perpetrators and innocents. Half of juve-
nile court cases today involve status offenses, neglect, and dependency. See Judge Lindsay G.
Arthur, Abolish the Juvenile Court?, Juv. & FAM. CT. J., Winter 1998, at 51, 54. For example,
parents can petition the juvenile or family court to help control their children under Persons or
Children in Need of Supervision (PINS or CHINS) statutes. See Barry C. Feld, The Transforma-
tion of the Juvenile Court, 75 MINN. L. REV. 691, 699 (1991). These "status offenders" may have
broken curfews or skipped school, but they are not criminals, and yet they do not match the pro-
file of an abuse or neglect victim.
3. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 24 (1967) (describing the desirability of wiping out juvenile
criminal records); ELLEN RYERSON, THE BEST LAID PLANS 40 (1978); cf. Kent v. United States,
383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966) (explaining that being "shielded from publicity" is one of the special
rights and immunities of juvenile court).
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delinquency cases. The landmark 1960s cases, Kent v. United States4 and
In re Gault,5 gave juveniles charged with crimes many of the same proce-
dural rights as adults but did not grant them the right to a public trial or
to a jury trial.6 Congress also emphasized confidentiality in passing the
1974 Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA).7 Following
CAPTA's guidelines, states enacted statutes that strictly protected the
confidentiality of child protective proceedings and child welfare agency
records.
More recently, disclosure restrictions have faced attack on multiple
fronts. Some critics argue against the separation of juvenile court from
adult court8 or question the enterprise of rehabilitation.9 Trials of delin-
quents should be open, some urge, because minors accused of serious
felonies have forfeited protection from public scrutiny.' ° In response, leg-
islators have passed laws mandating public trials for juveniles charged
with serious crimes." At the same time, news organizations have begun to
alter long-standing policies against printing the names and photographs
of juvenile offenders. 12 In this debate, confidentiality is still viewed as a
protective measure-but increasingly one that juvenile delinquents do
not deserve.
Meanwhile, from a different perspective, child advocates argue that
4. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
5. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
6. While closure has been the general rule, a few jurisdictions, like Philadelphia County,
have long opened juvenile court to the public. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 555
& n.2 (1971) (opinion of Brennan, J.).
7. CAPTA made grants to the states for prevention and treatment programs contingent on
passage of state laws that "provide[d] for methods to preserve the confidentiality of all records in
order to protect the rights of the child, his parents or guardians." Child Abuse Prevention and
Treatment Act, Pub. L. No. 93-247, 88 Stat. 4, § 4(b)(2)(E) (1974) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 89020)
(1976)) (amended by 42 U.S.C. § 5106a (1996)).
8. See, e.g., Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-Imaging Childhood and Reconstructing the Legal Order:
The Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. REv. 1083, 1120-29 (1991) (arguing that
juveniles would be better served by the procedural protections of adult criminal court in con-
junction with a system of lesser sentences); Barry Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of
Offense: Punishment, Treatment, and the Difference It Makes, 68 B.U. L. REV. 821, 903 (1988)
(arguing that renewed emphasis on punishment calls into doubt the adequacy of juvenile court
procedural protections); Feld, supra note 2, at 724. For an opposing view, see Arthur, supra note
2, at 51-54; Irene Merker Rosenberg, Leaving Bad Enough Alone: A Response to the Juvenile
Court Abolitionists, 1993 Wis. L. REv. 163, 175 (1993).
9. See Adam D. Kamenstein, Note, The Inner-Morality of Juvenile Justice: The Case for
Consistency and Legality, 18 CARDOZO L. REv. 2105, 2107 (1997) (arguing for abandonment of
treatment and rehabilitation as the juvenile court's primary goals).
10. See generally Arthur R. Blum, Comment, Disclosing the Identities of Juvenile Felons: In-
troducing Accountability to Juvenile Justice, 27 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 349 (1996).
11. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 676 (1998) (granting public access to juvenile
court trials for crimes such as murder, arson, robbery, rape, kidnapping, and assault). Other
states that hold public trials for serious juvenile offenders include Colorado, Idaho, Illinois, Kan-
sas, Missouri, and New Jersey. See Blum, supra note 10, at 353.
12. See infra note 115 and accompanying text.
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disclosure bans in dependency cases hamper efforts to improve child wel-
fare programs. Following the 1992 death of five-year-old Adam Mann in
New York, whose abuse history was known to child welfare officials, ad-
vocates complained to Congress that CAPTA-imposed state confidenti-
ality laws prevented caseworkers from talking with a child's teacher or
school counselor, a parent's drug treatment provider, or even the police
or prosecutor about how best to handle a case. 3 Yet support for access to
involved professionals does not necessarily imply support for public ac-
cess. Some advocates who think teachers, counselors, and police should
know more about a child's abuse and neglect history oppose sharing the
same information with the public because they believe doing so would
not serve an individual child's best interests. 4 They too view privacy as a
tool for safeguarding abused children from further harm.
A third group of critics believe public attention benefits children in
the child welfare system. They argue that strict disclosure rules shield
judges, lawyers, and caseworkers from accountability and obscure the
need for institutional reforms. 5 This conception of access emphasizes the
role of the press in exposing poor policy, and expects a properly informed
general public to call for reform. 6 There is a trade-off, however, for in-
creased public awareness that could benefit dependent children as a
group-potential risk to the individual child whose history is exposed.
In 1992, Congress responded to the various calls to relax disclosure
restrictions. Federal law now allows states to grant police, doctors, and
'7
counselors access to child welfare agency files. In some cases, states are
13. See Child Abuse Prevention, Adoption and Family Services Act: Hearings before the Sub-
comm. on Select Educ. of the House Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 102d Cong. 126 (1992)
(statement of Mary Margaret Oliver, Ga. House of Rep.) [hereinafter 1992 House Comm.
Hearings]; TEMPORARY COMMISSION OF INVESTIGATION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK,
SECRETS THAT CAN KILL: CHILD ABUSE INVESTIGATIONS IN NEW YORK STATE 29-30 (1996)
[hereinafter SECRETS THAT CAN KILL]. Organizers of child abuse and fatality review panels also
told Congress that efforts to trace systemic failure were at times frustrated because records are
sealed or expunged. See 1992 House Comm. Hearings, supra, at 249-50 (statement of Susan J.
Wells, Director of Research for the American Bar Association Center on Children and the
Law).
14. See ALICE BUSSIERE ET AL., ABA CENTER ON CHILDREN AND THE LAW, SHARING
INFORMATION: A GUIDE TO FEDERAL LAWS ON CONFIDENTIALITY AND DISCLOSURE OF
INFORMATION FOR CHILD WELFARE AGENCIES 10 (1997) ("In striking a balance between
maintaining confidentiality and disclosing information, confidentiality should take precedence
unless disclosure is necessary to further the goals of child protection."); Telephone interview
with Gary Solomon, Director of Training for the New York Legal Aid Juvenile Rights Division
(June 1, 1998).
15. See SECRETS THAT CAN KILL, supra note 13, at 131.
16. See Jan L. Trasen, Note, Privacy v. Public Access to Juvenile Court Proceedings, 15 B.C.
THIRD WORLD L.J. 359, 382 (1995).
17. See Juvenile Justice Delinquency and Prevention Amendments, Pub. L. No. 102-586 §
9(a), 106 Stat. 5036 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(4)(B) (1994)).
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instructed to grant limited access to the public. 8 Since the congressional
revisions, states have widened the circle of access.' 9 But they have done
so in sharply contrasting ways.
California court rules, for example, allow law enforcement agencies,
the school district where a child is enrolled, and treatment providers to
review a dependent or delinquent child's records without a court order.0
But in California and most other states, members of the public and the
press may not see dependency records or attend a hearing without the
consent of the child and his or her parent or guardian.2' California allows
public access to delinquency cases only in cases in which children commit
serious crimes.22
In contrast to California, New York in 1996 authorized child welfare
agencies to disclose publicly names, findings, and other facts about some
child abuse and neglect investigations. In 1997, New York's family court,
which hears delinquency and dependency cases, declared its proceedings
presumptively open to the public.24
25With the increasing exception of minors who commit serious crimes,
California and New York share the goal of rehabilitation for delinquents.
Abused and neglected children, for their part, retain an affirmative right
to state protection and treatment. The states' differing approaches to
18. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 5106a(b)(2)(A)(v)-(vi) (West 1998).
19. Twenty-seven states and the District of Columbia have statutes that track the 1992
CAPTA amendments. See Susan S. Greenbaum, Conditional Access to Juvenile Court Proceed-
ings: A Prior Restraint or a Viable Solution?, 44 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 135,138 n.15
(1993) (citing state statutes in which courts may grant access to parties with a "direct" or
"legitimate" interest in a case in Alabama, Arizona, California, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New York, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washing-
ton, Washington, D.C., West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming).
20. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 827 (1998).
21. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 346 (1998).
22. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 676 (1998). The public's right to access in such cases is
not contingent on the consent of the juvenile and his or her parent or guardian.
23. The law authorizes a city or county social services commissioner to disclose investigatory
information about the abuse of a child if the subject of an abuse report has been criminally
charged; an investigation has already been disclosed by law enforcement agents or by the subject
of the report; or a child has died. See N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 422-a (Consol. 1997).
24. The new rules put into practice a long-standing presumption of open court that was
rarely implemented. See Alan Finder, Chief Judge in New York Tells Family Courts to Admit
Public, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 1997, at Al.
25. New York Penal Law § 30.00 establishes criminal liability for juveniles ages 13 and over
charged with murder, kidnapping, arson, manslaughter, assault, rape, robbery, and other crimes.
Initial jurisdiction over minors charged with these crimes is in adult criminal court. Mitigating
circumstances must be present for the case to be removed to family court. See N.Y. CRIM. PRO.
LAW § 180.75(c)(4) (Consol. 1997). For a description of the New York Juvenile Justice Reform
Act of 1976, which lowered the age of criminal liability, see PETER S. PRESCOTT, THE CHILD
SAVERS: JUVENILE JUSTICE OBSERVED 29-30 (1981). For an account of the national trend of
sending serious juvenile criminals to adult court, see Jonathan Simon, Law and the Postmodern
Mind: Power Without Parents, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 1363, 1402 (1995).
Vol. 18:155, 1999
Public Access to Juvenile and Family Court
public access, then, must turn on how best to achieve rehabilitation and
harm prevention.
This paper considers the merits of allowing the public and press access
to dependency and delinquency cases, as in New York, and of barring the
public and press, as in California. I chose these two states because they
exemplify contrasting approaches. Part One examines three rulings by
New York and California courts on petitions to open dependency and
delinquency proceedings. The cases illustrate the range of variables-
such as age, type of proceeding, and type of access-that courts confront.
They also demonstrate the way in which statutory differences affect how
judges balance the state's interest in protecting privacy against the pub-
lic's interest in obtaining information.
Part II briefly presents historical arguments in favor of confidentiality.
I look at why turn-of-the-century reformers closed the first juvenile
courts and why federal and state law emphasized confidentiality. Part III
considers arguments in favor of public access. I begin with Supreme
Court rulings that the public has a constitutional right to attend adult
criminal court proceedings,26 in part because the right acts as one of the
"checks-and-balances" on government. I then examine the idea that the
public as audience can help to generate and express community norms.21 I
suggest how considering these rationales might help juvenile and family
courts exercise more reasoned discretion. Finally, I look at one example
of how New York's access laws may have generated public pressure for
better cooperation between child welfare and school officials.
Part IV uses the Supreme Court rulings and the cases discussed in
Part I to develop a set of factors that juvenile and family court judges
could use to weigh the state's interest in protecting children's privacy. I
return to the three cases explored in Part I to demonstrate how these fac-
tors on the one hand, and consideration of the value of developing com-
munity norms on the other, can ground judges in balancing privacy and
access. Finally, I ask what statutory changes might be called for in light of
how this decision-making method would fare under current California
and New York law.
26. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982); Richmond Newspa-
pers Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
27. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Due Process: A Public Dimension, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 405, 416-
21(1987).
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I. PETITIONS FOR OPEN JUVENILE COURT PROCEEDINGS
A. Statutory Frameworks
The 1997 New York Family Court rules state that Family Court is
open to the public and the news media. New York courts have held that
family court proceedings should be open absent a compelling reason for
closure.8 Judges can exclude the public or any person only "on a case-by-
case basis based upon supporting evidence., 29 In exercising discretion
over whether to allow access, judges may consider whether closure or ex-
clusion of an individual is necessary to prevent disruption, to protect the
privacy interests of the parties, or to protect "the litigants, in particular,
children, from harm."30 The judge also may consider whether a party's
objection to the observer's presence is compelling and whether less re-
strictive means are available for resolving the objections. Before closing
31the court, judges must make findings about their reasons for doing so.
The corresponding California statute governing access to dependency
proceedings reverses this presumption. The law bars the public from at-
tending these hearings unless the child's parent or guardian consents. The
statute also states that judges may "nevertheless" admit people deemed
to have a "direct and legitimate interest in the particular case or the work
32
of the court," requiring the party seeking access to show good cause. But
California courts have interpreted the parental or guardian consent
clause to mean that the press and the public do not have a direct or le-
gitimate interest.33 The California Rules of Court reinforce this under-
28. See In re Ruben R., 219 A.D.2d 117 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (public access to court pro-
ceedings is strongly favored both under federal and state law); In re Katherine B., 189 A.D.2d
443 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993); In re M.S., 662 N.Y.S.2d 207 (Fam. Ct. 1997) (recognizing presump-
tion of openness of court proceedings that may be overcome only by a finding that closure is es-
sential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest).
29. N.Y. CT. R. § 205.4 (b).
30. N.Y. CT. R. § 205.4 (b)(3).
31. See N.Y. CT. R. § 205.4 (b)(4).
32. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 346 (1998). The statute governing access to delinquency
proceedings is identical except that the public is permitted to attend proceedings involving mi-
nors accused of committing serious crimes. See id. § 676(a). Other states also distinguish between
dependents and minor offenders and delinquents who have committed a serious crime. See, e.g.,
Tennessee v. James, 902, S.W.2d 911 (Tenn. 1995). Two federal appellate courts similarly have
found that the federal Juvenile Delinquency Act allows for closure only on a case-by-case basis.
See United States v. Three Juveniles, 61 F.3d 86 (1st Cir. 1995); United States v. A.D., 28 F.3d
1353 (3d Cir. 1994).
33. See, e.g., San Bernardino County Dep't of Pub. Soc. Services v. Superior Court, 283 Cal.
Rptr. 332 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 1991); In re Keisha T., 38 Cal. App. 4th 220 (1995). Other state
courts have reasoned similarly. See, e.g., New Jersey Div. of Youth and Family Serv. v. J.B., 576
A.2d 261 (N.J. 1990) (holding that the case involved the rare situation in which the public's right
to attend proceedings was not outweighed by the State's compelling interest in conducting a pri-
vate hearing); In re T.R., 556 N.E.2d 439 (Ohio 1990) (holding that there is no presumption of
openness in juvenile court and that the press has no qualified right of access to these proceed-
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standing by allowing judges to permit access to juvenile court records or
proceedings "only insofar as is necessary, and only if there is a reasonable
likelihood that the records in question will disclose information or evi-
dence of substantial relevance to the pending litigation, investigation, or
prosecution., 34 Such grants of access may be accompanied by protective
orders.35
B. In re Katherine B., In re Keisha T., and In re M.S.
This Part looks at three petitions for access to dependency and delin-
36quency proceedings. The first, In re Katherine B., concerns a petition by
major media outlets to attend a child protective hearing in New York re-
garding a widely publicized case of child sexual abuse. In the second, In
re Keisha T.,37 a California newspaper sought access to the unnamed ju-
venile court files of ten dependency cases for a series of articles about the
systemic failures of the regional child welfare agency. The third, In re
M.S.,38 involves a petition for access by New York print and television re-
porters to cover the delinquency trial of Malcolm Shabazz, charged with
setting a house fire that led to his grandmother's death.
Ten-year-old Katherine was kidnapped by an adult family friend and
imprisoned for sixteen days in his basement. After a police rescue, New
York began an abuse and neglect proceeding against her mother. Kath-
erine went to live in a foster home. Her plight drew intense attention
from the media. The Suffolk County Department of Social Services, with
the support of Katherine's lawyer and the district attorney, sought to
close the abuse and neglect proceeding to the public. The department ar-
gued that continuing public attention would be contrary to Katherine's
best interests. In support of this claim, it presented an affidavit from an
examining psychologist who said that opening the courtroom would
"revictimize" Katherine, whose "feelings of embarrassment and
shame.., are intensified and exacerbated by her knowledge that these
facts are not private."39 Katherine also submitted her own affidavit. She
wrote:
I Don't Want People To Know What HAPPEND To ME, Because It's None
of THERE BISINESS. A MEAN Little Boy Was Saying Things About ME
Last Week and It Made ME Sad. If Everyone Saw MY Life on T.V. iT
WILL Upset ME AALLOOTT. Please Don't Put MY CASE On T.V. It's
ings).
34. CAL. R. OF CT. 1423 (1998).
35. See id.
36. 189 A.D.2d 443 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993).
37. 38 Cal. App. 4th 220 (1995).
38. 662 N.Y.S.2d 207 (Fam. Ct. 1997).
39. In re Katherine B., 189 A.D.2d at 448.
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BBAADD Enough That It's In the Papers. Sincerely, Katherine.
4
0
Lawyers for NBC, CBS, ABC, the New York Times, and the New York
Daily News argued that the presumption of openness of Family Court
proceedings was a matter of constitutional law and state statute.41
The family court of Suffolk County ruled in favor of admitting the
press to the hearing set to determine whether Katherine's mother had
abused or neglected her. The family court judge noted that the press had
already attended related proceedings without causing disruption; the is-
sues to be discussed in court had already been aired publicly; and access
might help to focus the media's attention on events in court rather than
on Katherine's new foster home, neighborhood, and school.42 In addition,
the judge argued that opening the courtroom furthered the goal of keep-
ing the public informed of the court's work. The court noted the
"important public and legislative educational component" of open court.
"Enhancing public understanding of the works of its municipal offices is
important if there is to be public confidence in court proceedings," the
judge wrote.43
On appeal, the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court
reversed. The appeals court rejected the argument that the press had a
constitutional right to attend family court proceedings. The court also
cited an Ohio decision holding that the need for confidentiality is more
compelling for dependent children than for delinquents.44 The court fur-
ther found that the public's interest in criminal matters is "not present" in
child protective proceedings.
Finally, the court rejected the claim that New York's statute granted
the press a right to attend Katherine's hearing. Instead, the appeals court
interpreted the Family Court rules as balancing the right of public and
46press access against the state's interest in protecting a child from harm.
The court offered several factors for consideration in weighing these in-
terests: the nature of the abuse allegations (with sexual abuse weighing
heavily against closure), the child's age and maturity, peer pressure from
40. Id. at 447. The quote is reproduced with the grammatical and spelling errors that appear
in the court reporter.
41. The press cited Richmond Newspaper Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980), and Globe
Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982), as conferring a constitutional right of
public access to adult criminal trials. See infra Section III.B for a discussion of these cases.
42. See In re Katherine B., 189 A.D.2d at 446.
43. Id.
44. See id. at 449 ("The delinquent child is at least partially responsible for the case being in
court: an abused, neglected or dependent child is wholly innocent of wrongdoing.") (citing In re
T.R., 556 N.E.2d 439, 449-50 (Ohio 1990)).
45. See id.
46. See id. at 450.
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classmates in school, and the potential for embarrassment.4 1
In re Keisha T 48 concerned a Sacramento Bee reporter's request to see
ten juvenile court files, Three children under Sacramento County's pro-
tection had recently died from abuse and neglect, and the reporter
planned to use the files to investigate the systemic shortcomings of the
county's child protective services.4 9 As a condition of access, the reporter
agreed to abide by a court order barring her from copying the files or
from publishing the identity of the children, their families and caretakers,
and those who had reported the abuse. ° The juvenile court judge granted
access to some information in the files on this basis.
The children's lawyers objected. They argued that California law did
not permit public disclosure of juvenile court records, that disclosure
would be against the children's best interests, and that the protective or-
der did not sufficiently protect their clients from harm." The Sacramento
County Department of Health and Human Services also opposed the ju-
venile court's order granting the Bee limited access.
The California Court of Appeals remanded the juvenile court's order
to grant qualified access to ten dependency files. The appeals court found
that the state legislature had intended to keep juvenile records confiden-
tial. The court noted that there could be a situation in which "competing
interests" required some disclosure. 2 But while police, school officials,
and treatment providers might merit access on these grounds, the media
did not. 3
Like the New York appeals court, the California court framed its de-
cision about whether to grant access as a balancing test between the so-
cial value of informing the public and the best interests of the child. The
appellate court then proposed several specific factors for the juvenile
court to consider: the child's age, the nature of the allegations, the nature
of the publicity, and the effect of disclosure on the child and on family
reunification. 4 The court further ordered the juvenile court to determine
whether opening the files was necessary to "permit public awareness and
monitoring of the juvenile welfare system," or whether adequate infor-
mation could be obtained elsewhere. Finally, the party seeking disclo-
47. See id. at 451.
48. 38 Cal. App. 4th 220 (1995).
49. See id. at 226.
50. See id at 226-27.
51. See id. at 227.
52. Id. at 231.
53. See id. at 234.
54. See id. at 239.
55. Id. at 240.
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sure bore the burden of showing good cause.56 With these guidelines, the
case was remanded.
In re M.S. involves an application by the New York Daily News to
cover the criminal trial of Malcolm Shabazz, the grandson of civil rights
leaders Malcolm X and Betty Shabazz. Twelve-year-old Malcolm was
charged with setting a house fire that led to Betty Shabazz's death. Four
reporters and a sketch artist attended the first hearing on the ensuing de-
linquency charges. Malcolm's lawyer then objected to press access. After
hearing medical testimony indicating that publicity might skew the results
of Malcolm's psychiatric testing, the Family Court closed the proceed-
ings. The press intervened, claiming a constitutional right of access that
could be overcome only by a compelling state interest and a state statu-
tory presumption favoring public access. Malcolm's lawyer and the
prosecuting County Attorney countered that press access is not an abso-
lute right and that, in this case, the family court's aim of rehabilitating
Malcolm could be compromised by widespread publicity.
7
The New York family court reversed its earlier decision favoring clo-
sure, ruling only weeks after the state family court, as a whole, issued its
1997 rules calling for routine public access. Rather than rejecting the
press's constitutional claim, the court found a principle favoring public
access to be "firmly rooted" in the First Amendment and in federal and
state case law. 8 The court said the new Family Court rules suggested a
balancing test between the state's interest in protecting children and the
public's interest in open hearings, but that "judicial discretion must be
exercised against a strong presumption of openness."5 9 Closure might be
more appropriate for an "innocent victim of abuse and neglect," the court
noted.60 But when a child was accused of committing a serious crime, and
extensive press coverage had already taken place, the court's responsibil-
ity to the child "must be considered in tandem with its responsibility to
consider the need to protect the community., 61 The court found that Mal-
colm's lawyers offered little evidence to support their contention that
opening the proceedings would cause their client emotional harm. Fi-
nally, it cited the possibility that misinformed reporting could pose its
own harm. Based on these factors, the court admitted two print reporters
to be seated in the back of the courtroom, but barred TV and radio cov-
erage.
56. See id.
57. See In re M.S., 662 N.Y.S.2d at 208.
58. Id.
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The family court's final words underscore the difference between
New York and California's approaches. "Justice cannot prevail under a
veil of secrecy or behind doors that do not open," the court intoned.
"Darkness must give way to light."62 Such rhetoric aside, In re Katherine
B., In re Keisha T., and In re M.S. demonstrate that the New York court
rules and case law are more receptive in several ways to petitions for ac-
cess than their California counterparts. First, the California statute differ-
entiates between the direct and legitimate interest of service providers
and law enforcement officials in dependency proceedings and the public's
lack of such an interest. Second, the California court placed the burden of
showing good cause on the party seeking access, whereas the New York
courts placed the burden on the party seeking closure. Third, the Califor-
nia court weighed the decision about whether to grant access in terms of
whether a more limited form of access could accomplish the same goal.
Fourth, the New York court in In re M.S. interpreted U.S. Supreme
Court rulings granting access to criminal proceedings as extending in
principle to juvenile courts as well.63
Yet the New York and California statutes and case law also share
common ground. Courts in both states indicated that dependent children
have a greater claim to confidentiality than delinquent ones. Both con-
ceived of the decision about whether to grant access as a balancing test
between the public's right to information and the best interests of the
child. And by closing a dependency hearing in light of the sexual abuse
Katherine B. suffered, her psychiatrist's recommendation, and her own
expressed wishes, the New York appellate court in In re Katherine B.
demonstrated that New York's presumption of openness does not dictate
public access to all child abuse and neglect cases.4
C. Factors in Decision-making
These three cases raise issues that courts could consider in deciding
whether to allow public access to juvenile and family court proceedings.
Each area of consideration prompts underlying questions.
62. Id. at 210.
63. See infra Section III.B. for a discussion of the Supreme Court rulings in Richmond
Newspaper Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980); see also Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior
Court., 457 U.S. 586, 606 (1982).
64. See In re Ruben R., 219 A.D.2d 117 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (holding that the right of the
public and press to attend court proceedings may be overcome by an overriding interest, in this
case evidence setting forth enormous potential harm to children). Although it is not certain that
the appeals court would have closed Katherine's hearing after the promulgation of the 1997
Family Court Rules, it is possible-if not likely-that the court would have. The revised rules
continue to allow judges to take into account an objection by the parties, the parties' privacy in-
terests, and the potential for harm to the child. See N.Y. CT. R. § 205.4 (a)(2)(3).
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To begin, the cases suggest that one factor is the child's age. At the
time of their court proceedings, Katherine was ten, Malcolm was twelve,
and the ages of Keisha and the other nine children in that case were not
reported. How should the children's ages factor into a judge's decision
about whether to grant public access? Do older children have a greater
claim to privacy than younger children? Although states are generally re-
sponsible for dependent children until the age of eighteen, some have
lowered the age at which juvenile offenders are treated like adults, par-
ticularly when they commit serious crimes. 65 Thus, in some jurisdictions,
judges might find they have an interest in shielding a dependent child un-
til age eighteen, but a delinquent child only until a younger age.
Courts could also consider a child's maturity level or state of mental
health. In In re Katherine B., the treating psychologist testified that public
access would cause Katherine to be "revictimized." In In re M.S., the
court faulted Malcolm's lawyers for failing to submit medical evidence
supporting their claim that publicity would augment his psychological
problems. How should a court assess the impact of publicity on an emo-
tionally vulnerable child? How much weight should the court give evi-
dence, or the lack of evidence, of a child's ability to cope? This last factor
allows judges to consider sexual abuse charges or a diagnosis of mental
illness in terms of how they affect the child's capacity for resilience or
grasp of his or her situation. Legislatures or courts could indicate whether
evidence of suffering from such harms suggests a greater interest in pri-
vacy, as the Supreme Court indicated in Globe. They could also guide
judges in the extent to which they should rely on testimony from psychi-
atric experts.
Another factor for consideration is the type of proceeding at issue.
Katherine was a sexually abused child for whom the court must decide
whether to continue foster care. In re Keisha T. also involved dependency
matters. Malcolm Shabazz was an emotionally disturbed juvenile charged
with the crime of arson. Should Katherine and Keisha T.'s cases remain
closed because these children are in court due to their parents' failings, as
the presiding judges argue? Should Malcolm's case be open because he is
in court due to his own actions? In states like New York, in which serious
juvenile offenders are transferred out of juvenile or family court, but in
which low-level offenders receive rehabilitative services, courts could ac-
cord a lesser privacy interest to serious offenders and group other delin-
quents with dependents.
Another consideration is the type of access requested. Major news or-
ganizations had reported the particulars of Katherine and Malcolm's
65. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 30.00 (Gould 1998), described supra note 25.
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cases and planned to continue reporting about them. Should this wide-
spread interest have induced the courts to take steps to protect the chil-
dren's privacy, or did it offer an opportunity to educate the public about
the work of the court? Should the court have treated the press coverage
as inevitable and opened the proceedings in the hopes of generating more
accurate reporting?
The In re Keisha T. cases, by contrast, would not have become public
without the juvenile court's grant of access. The Sacramento Bee wanted
to use the confidential files to illustrate with specifics a more general
story about child welfare agency problems. Should this distinction, which
could be characterized as investigative rather than sensationalized jour-
nalism, matter to the court? Because the press often functions as a stand-
in for the public, courts might consider the kind of media attention that
public access is likely to generate. While sensationalized media coverage
poses a danger,66 access to the detail-rich proceedings and records of ju-
venile and family court may also deepen the press coverage that harrow-
ing delinquency and dependency cases often generate, producing more
varied, textured accounts.67
Courts may also wish to take into account a child's wishes. In In re
Katherine B., the appeals court cites Katherine's statement in support of
its decision to close the courtroom. The lawyers for the Keisha T. de-
pendents and Malcolm Shabazz also objected to opening the court,
though we do not learn whether the basis for their objections was their
clients' wishes or their judgment about the children's best interests.
Should courts ensure that they learn of a child's wishes, or is it sufficient
or more appropriate to use the attorney's assessment of the child's best
interests? Decisions about how much weight to accord children's wishes
recur in many juvenile and family court contexts, with little consensus
about the answer.68
66. Media coverage can exacerbate the privacy risks inherent in access. Advocates note that
reasons to protect the information disclosed in juvenile and family court include "avoiding em-
barrassment and humiliation, such as through disclosing details of sexual abuse [and] avoiding
exposing inflammatory information, such as HIV status." See BUSSIERE ET AL, supra note 14, at
4.
67. See infra Section III.D for a discussion of press coverage of the death of Sabrina Green.
See also Francine T. Sherman, Thoughts on a Contextual View of Juvenile Justice Reform Drawn
from Narratives of Youth, 68 TEMP. L. REv. 1837, 1847 n.44 (1995) (quoting the author of a New
York Times Magazine story on girl gang members about how difficult it is to publish stories that
do not focus on a particular crime or more sensational aspect of delinquency).
68. Compare Jean Koh Peters, The Roles and Content of Best Interests in Client-Directed
Lawyering for Children in Child Protective Proceedings, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 1507, 1509 (1996)
("Clients, not lawyers, set the objectives of their legal representations."), with JOSEPH
GOLDSTEIN ET AL., THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD: THE LEAST DETRIMENTAL AL-
TERNATIVE 144 (1996 ed.) ("Counsel cannot turn directly to the children whom she represents
for instructions; children are by definition persons in need of adult caregivers who determine
what is best for them.").
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The categories I have outlined also interact. Should the wishes of an
older or more mature child be given greater weight than those of a
younger or less mature child? If the difference between Katherine and
Malcolm's ages and reasons for being in court are not dispositive on their
own, should they be so when taken together? Does Malcolm's history of
emotional problems further his claim to be seen as a victim rather than a
perpetrator? The answers to these questions depend in part on one's
normative approach to issues of privacy and access.
II. ARGUMENTS FOR CONFIDENTIALITY
A. Juvenile Court Origins: 1900-1960
The turn-of-the-century progressives who created the juvenile courts
blamed urban conditions of poverty and the stresses of large-scale immi-
gration and industrialization for juvenile crime.6 9 The child-savers, as his-
torians later nicknamed these progressives,7 ° believed that sending trou-
bled juveniles to prisons filled with adult offenders would lead them to
71
commit more crimes. So they set out to provide a new, transformative
setting: a separate court to handle juvenile cases and separate institutions
in which to house offending minors. The idea was to dispense a kind of
therapeutic justice" to help the children become productive, crime-free
adults. In keeping with this belief, the reformers also sought authority for
pre-delinquency intervention. Juvenile court judges acquired jurisdiction
over boys who were wandering the streets and over girls who were beg-
ging or uncared for. 73 The courts' broad powers superseded the parental
interest to which courts have long accorded deference in other contexts.74
As a result, the conceptual difference between dependency and delin-
quency had little meaning in the early juvenile courts 75
69. See RYERSON, supra note 3, at 24.
70. See, e.g., ANTHONY PLATT, THE CHILD-SAVERS (1969).
71. See id. at 37.
72. See Simon, supra note 25, at 1364.
73. See PLAT', supra note 70, at 104 (citing an Illinois statute authorizing the juvenile court
to hear cases of children suffering from "want of proper parental care, mendicancy, ignorance,
idleness, or vice"). In 1873, the Illinois Supreme Court held, however, that such children could
not be sent to the state's reform school. See id. at 105. New York did not make a similar distinc-
tion until 1930. See Judith Areen, Intervention Between Parent and Child: A Reappraisal of the
State's Role in Child Neglect and Abuse Cases, 63 GEO. L.J. 887, 910 (1975).
74. See Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Serv., 452 U.S. 18, 38 (1981) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(noting that the parental interest "occupies a unique place in our legal culture, given the central-
ity of family life as the focus for personal meaning and responsibility").
75. See MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE 250-52 (1990); see also PLATT,
supra note 70, at 117 (discussing the child-savers' belief that no "distinction should be made be-
tween dependent and delinquent children if prevention of crime was to be realistically
achieved").
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By the 1920s, the progressives had succeeded in establishing special
courts for juveniles in almost every state.76 To justify their new role, the
juvenile courts adopted the legal construct of parens patriae,7 which justi-
fied heightened state authority over children and authorized the state to
act in loco parentis.78 With parens patriae as their guiding principle, the
early juvenile courts rejected the adult criminal justice model of fact-
finding jury verdicts of guilt. Instead they relied on juvenile court judges
to serve more as counselors than as adjudicators. 79 To do this work well, a
judge needed flexibility to gather a range of testimony about who a child
was and how he 8° had become that way. Often judges made general find-
ings of delinquency rather than handing down specific convictions.8'
The emphasis on informality and flexibility supported closing the ju-
venile courts. Public access could get in the way of rehabilitation.8 2 If
courts were closed to the public, a child could confess his troubles without
fear of public stigma. 83 Closed records would prevent a record of juvenile
offenses from being used against defendants in adult court.84 Confidenti-
76. See RYERSON, supra note 3, at 4. At about the same time, some states created family
courts with jurisdiction over a range of legal matters related to children and families. The first
family court in Cincinnati dates from 1914. See Babb, supra note 1, at 480.
77. The phrase, which means "parent of the country," refers to the state's role as sovereign
and guardian of juveniles. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1137 (7th ed. 1999). In the mid-17th-
century, parens patriae placed the English king at the head of each family as ultimate guardian,
creating an equitable remedy for orphans whose estates were in jeopardy. See Simon, supra note
25, at 1378. In its more punitive guise, parens patriae fed into an earlier practice of removing the
children of the poor from their families. See RYERSON, supra note 3, at 42; Areen, supra note 73,
at 895. Areen details how the practice of apprenticing out poor children or housing them in
almshouses or orphanages, often under rough and unmonitored conditions, was exported to
America and continued through the 19th century. See id. at 899-902.
78. "In loco parentis" means "in place of a parent." See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 791
(7th ed. 1999). As the Supreme Court noted, the "Latin phrase [parens patriae] proved to be a
great help to those who sought to rationalize the exclusion of juveniles from the constitutional
scheme."In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16 (1967).
79. See Martha Minow, Whatever Happened to Children's Rights?, 80 MINN. L. REV. 267,
279 (1995).
80. While the majority of juvenile offenders were male, the majority of status offenders were
female. Girls came to the attention of the juvenile court for engaging in "morally dubious be-
havior" or for "behavior considered to be promiscuous." They often received indeterminate sen-
tences and therefore could spend more time in detention than male juveniles convicted of felo-
nies. See Laurie Schaffner, Female Juvenile Delinquency: Sexual Solutions, Gender Bias, and
Juvenile Justice, 9 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 8-9 (1998) (citing MARY E. ODEM, DELINQUENT
DAUGHTERS: PROTECTING AND POLICING ADOLESCENT FEMALE SEXUALITY IN THE UNITED
STATES 1885-1920, at 113-16 (1995)).
81. See RYERSON, supra note 3, at 40-43. According to a 1920s study, many juvenile courts
handled more than half their cases without a formal inquiry to establish guilt, and some courts
handled more than three-quarters of their cases that way. See id. at 93 & 169 n.26 (citing Kath-
erine Lenroot, The Evolution of the Juvenile Court, ANNALS, CV 26 (Jan. 23, 1923)).
82. See Trasen, supra note 16, at 370; supra note 3 and accompanying text.
83. See Blum, supra note 10, at 361; Minow, supra note 79, at 279.
84. See RYERSON, supra note 3, at 39-40 (citing The Reformation of Juvenile Delinquents
Through Juvenile Court, Procs. of NCCC, XXX 213 (1903) and OUR PENAL MACHINERY AND
ITS VICTIMS 47 (1884)).
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ality dovetailed with judicial discretion and lack of procedural con-
straint.85 The public, like juries and lawyers, would hinder the sensitive
task of helping children see the wrongfulness of their behavior or envi-
ronment.86
Some early observers expressed misgivings about the secretive nature
of juvenile proceedings; in 1913 Roscoe Pound likened the juvenile court
to a Star Chamber.87 The next decades brought evidence to support these
misgivings. The juvenile courts' shortcomings included little access to sus-
tained therapy, unprepared rotating judges, and use of adult jails for de-
tention of minors. 8 But the early wave of criticism led to few reforms.
Again in the 1960s, studies showed that juvenile courts often lacked social
work and psychiatric services. 89 They also lacked lawyers. 9°
Such findings made the juvenile court's relaxation of procedural rules
suspect.9' Closing the courts could lead the state to abuse its power.92 In
addition, confidentiality did not fulfill its promise of preventing stigma
because the Star Chamber was not completely sealed. Juvenile court se-
crecy "is more rhetoric than reality," the Supreme Court noted in the wa-
tershed case In re Gault,93 because a judge had discretion to give records
to the military, the FBI, and even to prospective employers.94
B. Kent, In re Gault, and McKeiver: Confidentiality Preserved in
Delinquency Proceedings
The Supreme Court began to address the juvenile court's procedural
85. For example, juvenile courts use a lower threshold for establishing guilt: preponderance
of the evidence rather than reasonable doubt. See PRESCOTT, supra note 25, at 57.
86. By contrast, custody proceedings involving children were open in many states by the
1930s. See Mary Mcdevitt Gofen, Comment, The Right of Access to Child Custody and Depend-
ency Cases, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 857, 867 (1995).
87. See Roscoe Pound, The Administration of Justice in the Modern City, 26 HARV. L. REV.
302, 322 (1913). The term comes from a 15th-century English court known for its secret and op-
pressive procedures. See THE NEW OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1993 ed.).
88. See RYERSON, supra note 3, at 140-46.
89. See generally GORDON L. LIPPITr & SHIRLEY D. MCCUNE, GEORGE WASH. U. CTR.
FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES, JUDGES LOOK AT THEMSELVES: A NEW APPROACH TO
JUDICIAL EDUCATION, THE FIRST YEAR'S EVALUATION STUDY OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL
OF JUVENILE COURT JUDGES TRAINING PROGRAM (1963).
90. A 1959-60 study found that 92% of juvenile offenders in New York had no lawyer to
represent them. See PRESCOTT, supra note 25, at 58.
91. See id. at 77.
92. See DAVID J. ROTHMAN, The Progressive Legacy: Development of American Attitudes
Toward Juvenile Delinquency, in JUVENILE JUSTICE: THE PROGRESSIVE LEGACY AND
CURRENT REFORMS 34, 67 (1979) ("We no longer trust state or parents to act in a child's best
interest."); see also Blum, supra note 10, at 371 (describing how proponents of the juvenile court
began to lose faith in the state's ability to fulfill its role as parenspatriae).
93. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
94. See id. at 25.
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failings in 1966. In Kent v. United States,95 Chief Justice Warren wrote that
the state's guardian role could not be "an invitation to procedural arbi-
trariness., 96 A year later, an Arizona juvenile court sentenced fifteen-
year-old Gerald Gault to six years of reform school for making obscene
telephone calls. The boy's parents had no notice of his arrest, he had no
lawyer to represent him, and the state permitted him no appeal.97 In re
Gault led the Supreme Court to set a fundamental fairness standard for
juvenile courts based on six due process protections.98
Yet in introducing due process reform, the Court left the confidential
nature of the courts untouched. This aspect of In re Gault is striking given
that confidentiality rules were linked to two of the procedural abuses that
caught the Court's attention. Police picked up Gerald Gault on a June
morning in 1964. They did not relate the specific charges against him until
his hearing two months later-ostensibly to protect his privacy.99 When a
juvenile court judge committed the un-represented Gault to a reform
school until the age of twenty-one, there was no transcript of the hearing,
again because of confidentiality.100
Despite these facts, the In re Gault opinion does not discuss public
oversight or participation as a potential check on the juvenile courts'
power. Perhaps that is because the Court wanted procedural reform that
would not hinder the courts' rehabilitative mission. °1 Inadequate as the
juvenile court system might be, it still seemed better than the alternative
of treating children accused of crimes like adults.'O' Today defenders of
the juvenile court continue to argue that toughening procedural require-
ments inevitably will erode rehabilitation-based policies. °3
95. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
96. Id. at 555.
97. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
98. These protections were right to notice of the charges; right to counsel; right to confronta-
tion and cross-examination; privilege against self-incrimination; right to a transcript of the pro-
ceedings; and right to appellate review. See id., 387 U.S. at 10.
99. See id. at 25.
100. See id. at 58.
101. Justice Fortas wrote: "[T]he observance of due process standards, intelligently and not
ruthlessly administered, will not compel the States to abandon or displace any of the substantive
benefits of the juvenile process." Id. at 21.
102. See id. at 18 (citing REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW EN-
FORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE
SOCIETY 78 (1967) ("Although its shortcomings are many and its results too often disappointing,
the juvenile justice system in many cities is operated by people who are better educated and
more highly skilled, can call on more and better facilities and services, and has more ancillary
agencies to which to refer its clientele than its adult counterpart.")).
103. See Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 175 (arguing that attempting to improve juvenile court
procedure while preserving lighter sentencing may be unrealistic). But see Minow, supra note 79,
at 290-91 (arguing that as crime control increasingly pushes the juvenile justice agenda, minor
offenders receive neither adequate procedural protection nor treatment).
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Four years later, the Court addressed the issue of public access in
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,1°4 which turned on the question of whether ju-
veniles charged with crimes had a Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.
Justice Blackmun's plurality opinion recognized the flawed reality of ju-
venile justice. Nevertheless, the Court was still unwilling to give up on
the juvenile court experiment. The plurality feared that the presence of
juries would "put an effective end to what has been the idealistic prospect
of an intimate, informal protective proceeding."'°6
Justice Brennan, however, viewed public access in a wholly different
light. Brennan cast a key vote against requiring juvenile court juries.7
But in his concurrence, he stated that, to pass the fundamental fairness
test, a state must open juvenile court to the public.1° Justice Brennan de-
scribed the value of the jury as allowing "an appeal to the community
conscience." Public trials could serve a parallel function "by focusing
public attention upon the facts of [the] trial, exposing improper judicial
behavior to public view, and obtaining, if necessary, executive redress
through the medium of public indignation."' 09 Pennsylvania passed Bren-
nan's fairness test because it had open juvenile court proceedings. North
Carolina, the second defendant in the case, excluded the public and so
did not.
Justice Brennan had few illusions about the way the juvenile court
functioned. But he wrote that the court's "very existence as an ostensibly
beneficent and noncriminal process for the care and guidance of young
persons demonstrates the existence of the community's sympathy and
concern for the young."
110
It is doubtful that Justice Brennan could make the same assumptions
104. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
105. See id. at 543-44 ("We must recognize, as this Court has recognized before that the fond
and idealistic hopes of the juvenile court proponents and early reformers of three generations
ago have not been realized. The devastating commentary upon the system's failures as a whole..
reveals the depth of disappointment in what has been accomplished.").
106. Id. at 545.
107. Four Justices (Chief Justice Burger, Justice Blackmun, Justice Stewart, and Justice
White) joined the McKeiver majority opinion, which found that the fundamental fairness due
process standard for juvenile court does not include the right to a jury trial. Justice Harlan con-
curred in the judgment on the ground that criminal jury trials are not constitutionally required of
the states. Justice Brennan's concurrence in part, therefore, is the only still-valid basis for a ma-
jority holding.
108. Justice Brennan reached this conclusion by reasoning that a jury was not the only
means to ensure a fundamentally fair trial. He wrote, "the States are not bound to provide jury
trials on demand so long as some other aspect of the process adequately protects the interests
that Sixth Amendment jury trials are intended to serve." 403 U.S. at 554 (Brennan, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
109. Id. at 555.
110. Id.
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today about public sympathy for young felons."' Advocates for public ac-
cess to juvenile criminal proceedings now argue that the courts' mission
should be preserving public safety rather than rehabilitating its charges.
They press for public trials so delinquents can bear the full brunt of pub-
lic displeasure.' Some courts have found that the public has an interest
in delinquency proceedings akin to its interest in adult trials, and have
suggested that juvenile offenders do not have the same claim to privacy
as abused and neglected children because they are "at least partially re-
sponsible for the case being in court."".3 This rationale distinguishes be-
tween delinquents and dependents by assuming some guilt on the part of
the accused minors, reserving victim status for sufferers of abuse and ne-
glect.
In keeping with these sentiments, states like California now grant
public access to trials in which teenagers commit crimes such as murder,
rape, kidnapping, robbery, and assault.1 14 In addition, news organizations
are altering long-standing policies about identification of juvenile felons.
Traditionally, news outlets did not print or air the names of teenage
criminals because of a widely shared ethic that children deserved to be
shielded. Recently, that consensus has broken down. When thirteen-year-
old Mitchell Johnson and eleven-year-old Andrew Golden opened fire on
a school yard in Arkansas in March 1998, news organizations printed
their names, photographs, and detailed stories about their childhoods."5
This shift in attitude dovetails with a growing concern about serious
juvenile crime."6 Yet the call for trying serious juvenile offenders in pub-
lic and publishing their names and pictures does not address the question
of whether to maintain confidentiality for small-time delinquent offend-
ers. It also tends to overlook the fact that teenagers accused of robbery,
rape, and murder increasingly are tried in the adult criminal justice sys-
tem, where the public has a constitutional right to access."7 The stance of
111. For a discussion on changing attitudes toward children, see generally Minow, supra
note 79, and Sherman, supra note 67, at 1847.
112. See Blum, supra note 10, at 391-99.
113. San Bernardino County Dep't of Pub. Soc. Serv. v. Superior Court, 232 Cal. App. 3d
188, 200 n.7 (1991) (citing In re T.R., 556 N.E.2d 439, 449 (Ohio 1990)).
114. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 676(a) (West 1998).
115. One journalism professor responded to the no-holds-barred coverage by saying: "I
found that while I was startled to read their names, I was not offended." Mike Allen, Shielding
Young Suspects Is No Longer Automatic, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1998, at A14. When the boys
were sentenced for the shootings, the judge did not follow the state's usual practice of closing the
hearing to the public and allowed the press and family members and friends of the victims into
the courtroom. See Rick Bragg, Judge Punishes Arkansas Boys Who Killed 5, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
12, 1998, at Al.
116. Despite this concern, at least half of juvenile court cases are neglect, dependency, and
status offence matters. See Arthur, supra note 2, at 54.
117. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982); Richmond Newspa-
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the juvenile court critics is consistent with the long-standing notion that
disclosure is a vehicle for punishment. 18
C. Confidentiality in Dependency Proceedings
Confidentiality requirements in dependency cases historically have
been based on two arguments. First, court and child welfare agency rec-
ords in which there has been a finding of abuse and neglect should be
closed to protect the best interests of the child. Second, records of un-
founded or unsubstantiated charges should be sealed or expunged so that
government intervention does not infringe on the privacy rights of child
abuse reporters and of the parents these reporters are accusing. The lat-
ter argument, based on civil libertarian principles, is thus distinct from
anti-stigma and best-interests rationales in that it focuses not on shielding
children, but on protecting the privacy of adults.
In 1974, Congress expressed support for both of these positions in
passing the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA). 9
CAPTA mandated that states provide for "methods to preserve the con-
fidentiality of all records in order to protect the rights of the child, his
parent or guardians.
1 20
At the congressional subcommittee hearings that preceded CAPTA's
passage, a spokesperson for the federal Department of Health, Education
and Welfare cited "the serious problem of privacy" raised by child abuse
prevention, adding that "protection of citizens who report suspected
cases of child abuse is a difficult problem as well.'1
21
Lawmakers' concerns about confidentiality thus stemmed from sev-
eral sources. Congress sought to use disclosure bans to fulfill the govern-
ment's responsibility to abused children, to parents wrongfully accused of
abuse, to parents not yet found guilty of abuse, to the family unit, and to
third parties who reported suspected abuse, both correctly and incor-
pers Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980); infra Section III.B.
118. See Blum, supra note 10, at 353, 391-97.
119. Before passing CAPTA, the federal government primarily supported state efforts to
protect children by awarding grants for child welfare services. See Child Abuse Prevention and
Treatment Act: Hearings on S. 1191 Before the Subcomm. on Children and Youth of the Sen.
Comm. on Labor and Pub. Welfare, 93d Cong. 91 (1973) (statement of Stanley B. Thomas)
[hereinafter 1973 Sen. Comm. Hearings]. In the early 1970s, as the problem of child abuse gained
a higher profile, concern grew about stagnant funding and about the lack of uniformity and co-
operation among the states. See id. at 142-43 (statement of William G. Lunsford). CAPTA re-
quired states to report child abuse cases to a national registry, to mandate child abuse reporting,
and to grant immunity to reporters of abuse. See Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act,
Pub. L. No. 93-247, 88 Stat. 4, § 4(b)(2)(B)(C) (1974) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 89020)) (amended
by 42 U.S.C. § 5106a (1994)).
120. Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, Pub. L. No. 93-247,88 Stat. 4, § 4(b)(2)(E)
(1974) (codified at 5 U.S. C. § 89020)) (amended by 42 U.S.C. § 5106a (1994)).
121. 1973 Sen. Comm. Hearings, supra note 119, at 88 (statement of Stanley. B. Thomas).
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rectly.
By the 1990s, the mandates of government responsibility toward chil-
dren and accused parents were in conflict. A 1992 Frontline documentary
about the death of five-year-old Adam Mann, whose abuse history was
known to child welfare workers, partially blamed confidentiality laws for
the lack of coordination between the child's caseworker, police, and otherS 122
government agencies. In response, child advocates sought to step up the
government's efforts to intervene in cases of suspected abuse and to
widen the circle of access to current records by including more profes-
sionals. 123 At the same time, concerns about the damage that unfounded
reports caused to parents' reputations fueled a drive to restrict access to
records or ongoing investigations. 124
Congress sought to balance these competing concerns when it
amended CAPTA's confidentiality provisions in 1992 and 1996. Law-
makers found that strict confidentiality laws placed "an undue burden"
on abuse investigation. "[O]ften the purpose of confidentiality laws and
regulations are defeated when they have the effect of protecting those re-1 125
sponsible," they wrote. The new law required states to ensure that child
welfare agencies cooperated with police, courts, and human service pro-
viders working with abused and neglected children and their families.
126
At the same time, CAPTA continued to require that states preserve the
confidentiality of records to protect children and their parents or guardi-
ans. 127 In 1996, Congress expanded information-sharing further 128 and al-
lowed agencies to keep information on unsubstantiated reports "to assist
in future risk and safety assessment.,
129
For the first time, the 1996 CAPTA amendment also called for lim-
122. See Frontline: Who Killed Adam Mann? (PBS television broadcast, Dec. 3, 1991).
123. See 1992 House Comm. Hearings, supra note 13, at 249-50.
124. See Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act: Hearings before the Subcommittee on
Children and Family of the Committee of Labor and Human Resources, 104th Cong. 13 (1995)
(statement of Richard Wexler: "America's children are victimized by false allegations of child
abuse more than 2 million times a year").
125. Congressional Findings, Pub. Law. No. 102-586 § 9(a), 106 Stat. 5036 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 5106a(4)(B) (1994)).
126. See Juvenile Justice Delinquency and Prevention Amendments, Pub. Law. No. 102-586
§ 9(a), 106 Stat. 5036 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(4)(B) (1999)). Department of Health and
Human Services regulations authorized the disclosure of information about abuse and neglect
cases only to specific law enforcement and social service agencies. See 45 C.F.R. § 1340.14(i)
(1994). These regulations have been superseded by the 1996 amendments to 42 U.S.C. § 5106a
(Supp. 111996). Proposed regulations recommended that states extend disclosure provisions to
prosecuting attorneys, doctors, mental health providers, parents' substance abuse counselors,
foster families, and school officials. See 59 Fed. Reg. 26,046 (1994) (proposed revision to 45
C.F.R. § 1340.14(i) (1994)). The regulations have not yet been approved.
127. See 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(4)(A) (1994).
128. See supra text accompanying note 18.
129. 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(A)(viii) (Supp. 111996).
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ited outsider scrutiny at the federal level. The new law asked states to
disclose information about abuse and neglect cases to child abuse and fa-
tality citizen review panels, 3 ° and to publicly disclose investigatory find-
ings when a child dies or nearly dies from abuse.'
The 1992 and 1996 CAPTA amendments can be said to have two
goals in allowing for limited disclosure. The first goal is to aid prevention
and treatment by encouraging child welfare caseworkers to work with
police, prosecutors, schools, and treatment providers. The second goal is
to create a "watchdog" to scrutinize the work of the child welfare agen-
cies and juvenile and family courts that handle abuse and neglect cases.
But in recognizing the need for oversight, Congress primarily turned not
to the public, but to child fatality review panels.
3 2
CAPTA thus draws a line between limited disclosure to a contained
group of outsiders and broad disclosure to the public. Federal regulations
continue to require states to criminalize unauthorized disclosure of in-
formation concerning abuse and neglect cases.' They also restrict the
kind of information that can be released to researchers or to the press,
even when a child dies. 34 Many states have followed the CAPTA
amendments by allowing judges to grant parties with a "direct" or
"legitimate" interest to attend juvenile or family court proceedings.' But
few have followed New York in routinely opening the courts.
131
The distinction reflects the different risk to privacy posed by access
for professionals, citizen review panels, and the public. To be sure, wid-
ening the circle of professional access has implications for family privacy.
130. Citizen panels established to review child abuse and fatality cases were started in Los
Angeles, New York City, and Texas in the early 1980s to address undercounting of abuse cases
and inadequate investigatory procedures. See 1992 House Comm. Hearings, supra note 13, at 246
(statement of Susan J. Wells). Members are usually lawyers, doctors, counselors, and other citi-
zens with an interest in children's issues. Some panels focus on identifying systemic failures in
child welfare agencies and making legislative recommendations. See id. at 247. Others track indi-
vidual child abuse deaths. See Telephone Interview with Paul Hoffman, Child Protective Support
Team Director for the Administration of Children's Services (April 29, 1998).
131. See Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment and Adoption Reform Act of 1994, Pub.
Law. No. 105-153 (codified at 42 U.S. C. § 5106a (Supp. II 1996)).
132. See infra note 130.
133. See 45 C.F.R. § 1340.14(i) (1994).
134. While proposed CAPTA regulations would allow child welfare officials to acknowledge
the existence of an ongoing investigation, they would not be able to answer underlying questions
about a family's history or a caseworker or judge's decisions. They also would allow states to
grant access to records to a person or organization engaged in "bona fide" research, but only
without names or other identifying information, unless the researcher obtains the permission of a
state official and the child involved, through his or her representative. See 59 Fed. Reg. 26,046
(1994) (proposed revision to 45 C.F.R. § 1340.14(i) (1994)).
135. See infra note 19 and accompanying text.
136. Five states (Alaska, Colorado, Indiana, Iowa, and New Jersey) have laws that require a
judicial finding that a closed hearing is in the best interest of the child or the community. See
Greenbaum, supra note 19, at n.16.
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Police, treatment providers, and school officials may intrude on parents'
rights to make decisions for their children. Still, juvenile court judges and
child welfare workers have long intruded in this way into the lives of
families. Increasing access for professionals thus can be seen as an exten-
sion of the goal of promoting the best interests of the child.
A somewhat different rationale based on oversight and accountability
justifies extending access to citizen review panels. Giving panels detailed
information allows outsiders with no direct role to learn of families'
traumas and failures. But the small size of the panels means that families
will not confront the effects of scrutiny directly, as they might if their
neighbors were to read about them in the newspaper or see them on tele-
vision. By barring their members from becoming a source of disclosure,
the panels seek to bring themselves inside the circle of limited access.137 In
a sense, then, state laws that create exceptions to disclosure bans for in-
volved professionals and citizen panels, but do not provide for public ac-
cess, descend from the early juvenile court rules. The argument for wid-
ening access often turns out not to be an argument for allowing the public
into the courtroom, but rather for sharing information only with those
who have scripted roles as professionals or advocates.
III. ARGUMENTS FOR PUBLIC ACCESS
A. Access as Beneficial
If the rationale for expanding access to involved professionals and
citizen review panels does not justify public access, what does? In their
classic work on the best interests of the child, Joseph Goldstein, Albert
Solnit, Sonya Goldstein, and Anna Freud noted a "covert quality" in ju-
venile and family court work that is rarely dispelled unless a child dies.'38
Other observers argue that low visibility gives the courts an incentive to
speed through huge caseloads without giving adequate attention to indi-
vidual children."' Advocates of opening the courts believe the threat of
publicity will make judges, caseworkers, and lawyers exercise greater care
and professionalism in juvenile and family court.' 4°
137. American Bar Association guidelines for the review panels stress that individual mem-
bers cannot give out information, and suggest that panels report to the public only statistical data
that pose no risk of individual identification. See 1992 House Comm. Hearings, supra note 13, at
249.
138. See GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 68, at 174. The authors do not argue in favor of open
family court proceedings. Rather they urge social workers and judges to make their assumptions
visible so that the bases for their decisions and actions will be clear. See id. at 174, 195.
139. See Ainsworth, supra note 8, at 1128.
140. See Trasen, supra note 16, at 379-80.
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These advocates look to several sources for support. For example,
they cite the theory that disseminating information about how courts and
government work is essential to democracy. Constitutional protection for
the press's role in promoting an "unfettered interchange of ideas for the
bringing about of political and social changes" underpins Supreme Court
jurisprudence in First Amendment arenas such as libel law.14 In the con-
text of adult criminal proceedings, the Justices have held that states must
presume that adult criminal trials should be open to the public and the
media.142 While the Court has not applied this holding to juvenile and
family court, its argument that opening the courts serves a "checks-and-
balances" function in educating the public about how its laws and judicial
system work has relevance outside the adult criminal setting. Other
commentators argue that opening courtrooms may not necessarily lead
the public to impose higher standards, but does allow for the develop-
ment and expression of community norms in some form.14 ' Also, limited
empirical evidence from New York following the 1997 Family Court
Rules that presume in favor of open court shows that public access can
generate reform efforts. What is not clear is whether such efforts can sus-
tain momentum.
B. Richmond and Globe
144
In the 1980 case Richmond Newspaper Inc. v. Virginia, the Supreme
Court recognized a constitutional right of public access to criminal trials.
The Justices offered several First Amendment rationales for invalidating
a Virginia judge's order to close the trial of a murder defendant. They
cited the historic openness of criminal proceedings and observed that
open trials helped ensure fairness by discouraging court misconduct 4 5 and
had "therapeutic value" because they provided an outlet for community
reaction.146 They also approved the "educative effect of public atten-
dance" and backed the newspaper's claim that it was acting as a
"surrogate" for the public.147 In concurrence, Justice Brennan called the
141. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) (citing Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476, 484 (1957)). Professor Alexander Meiklejohn identified the connection between the
free press and democracy. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO
SELF-GOVERNMENT 26 (1948) ("The principle of the freedom of speech springs from the neces-
sities of the program of self-government.").
142. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982); Richmond
Newspaper Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
143. See Resnik, supra note 27, at 420.
144. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
145. See id. at 569.
146. Id. at 570.
147. Id. at 572-73.
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open trial one of the essential "checks and balances" of government. 148
Open trials protect the defendant by helping to ensure accuracy, 49 and
they build public confidence by "demonstrat[ing] the fairness of the law
to our citizens," the Justice wrote. 15
Two years later, when the Court struck down a Massachusetts law
that closed the courtroom for testimony of child victims of sexual abuse,
Brennan wrote for the majority. In response to the Boston Globe's at-
tempt to gain access to a rape trial involving seventeen and sixteen-year-
old victims, six justices found the state's mandatory closure statute inva-
lid. 5 ' Brennan again stressed the importance of an informed citizenry.
The public's ability to "participate in and serve as a check upon the judi-
cial process" is "an essential component in our structure of self-
government," he wrote.'52 To bar observers from a court, Globe held, a
trial judge must find that closure serves a compelling interest and is nar-
rowly tailored to serve its purpose. " '
The Globe Court emphasized the limited nature of this holding-it di-
d not prohibit the trial court from closing the courtroom for the teenag-
ers' testimony in the case at issue. Instead it had struck down a manda-
tory closure statute. But the Court found no difference in kind between
minor and adult victims of sexual abuse and did not propose special rules
of closure for minors.
C. Beyond Richmond and Globe
Richmond and Globe stand for the principle that the idea of a trial en-
tails an audience. Their holdings became the basis for subsequent Su-
preme Court and circuit court decisions granting access to a range of
court proceedings. 5 4 But some commentators have not found wholly per-
suasive the holdings' historical, community-catharsis, educative, and
checks-and-balances rationales. Judith Resnik questions the Court's
claims that open trials provide an outlet for community catharsis,5 5 that
148. Id. at 592 (Brennan, J., concurring).
149. See id. at 596.
150. Id. at 594.
151. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982). Justices Marshall, White,
Blackmun, and Powell joined the majority opinion. Justice O'Connor concurred in the judgment.
152. Id. at 606.
153. See id. at 607.
154. See Press Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1986) (Press Enterprise II);
Press Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984) (Press Enterprise I); Rushford v.
New Yorker Magazine, 846 F.2d 249 (4th Cir. 1988); Publicker Indus. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059
(3d Cir. 1984).
155. See Resnik, supra note 27, at 413 (noting that trials take place months after a crime is
committed, and that there is "no assurance that the community will either attend or learn of the
proceedings").
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educating the public through access will foster confidence in the judicial
system,156 and that public scrutiny will be wholly beneficial.
Resnik offers a different set of rationales for opening courtrooms. Ju-
dicial proceedings, she writes, offer an important opportunity for story-
telling. If the public hears them, the stories "may become the shared tales
of a variety of citizens-across social and ethnic boundaries."'57 Because
adjudication is an element of political life, access to court proceedings
allows the public to know its government better and to affect the way it
works-both to generate norms and to express them.'
Resnik does not imagine the public as a "single, homogenous com-
munity,"159 but recognizes that its multiplicity makes disseminating infor-
mation across communities important, either for hammering out shared
standards about how disputes should be handled, or for revealing the ar-
eas in which consensus cannot be reached. Informed discussion by the
public about dispute resolution is both a goal unto itself and the possible
means to establishing baseline standards for the day-to-day workings of
the justice system. Norm-generating, then, suggests a broader way to
think about the educative aspect of public access. Rather than assuming,
as Globe does, that an informed public will gain faith in the judicial sys-
tem, the collective storytelling model highlights the connection between
access and norms without assuming that the public will reach a particular
conclusion based on the information it receives.
The concept of norms expression is similarly useful in thinking about
how public scrutiny serves a checks-and-balances function. The correla-
tion between public knowledge and the behavior of judges and lawyers
need not be positive nor direct to merit consideration. Rather, a public
presence helps ensure that courts will follow established norms. Norm-
generation and expression does not idealize the public's function, but in-
stead recognizes that the public may act as a watchdog, or express indif-
ference or a taste for sensationalism. It treats Justice Brennan's faith in
the public as a possibility instead of a certainty, offering a more open-
ended way of understanding the public as audience.
D. Community Norms and Juvenile and Family Court
How might the rationale of norm-generation and expression help
judges make decisions about access in the juvenile and family court set-
156. See id. at 414 (noting that "the uses to which the information [from open trials] will be
put are far from certain").
157. Id. at 413-14.
158. See id. at 419-20.
159. Id. at 417.
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ting? Since their formation, juvenile and family courts have been signifi-
cant sites for the creation of narrative.'O Francine Sherman has pointed
out that because children can rarely tell their own stories and do not
make their own laws, it is important to inject their voices into the public161
arena. Access to juvenile and family court proceedings, it can be ar-
gued, helps achieve this goal because the proceedings expose the circum-
stances of certain children's lives. In court, involved professionals and
family members sort out what wrongs have been done either to children
or by them. Information flows about the child's past and present. The
child may even voice his or her own perspective. The search for root
causes and solutions can provide a thumbnail sketch or detailed picture
of the child's experience.
Advocates for opening these courts argue that children in juvenile
and family court feel the absence of community norm-generation. 62 The
courts are woefully crowded, chaotic, and overwhelmed. Judges routinely
spend only minutes deciding to sentence children to a lock-down facility
or to place them with a relative, foster parent, or group home. Heavy
caseloads and low pay provide an incentive for harried lawyers and social
workers to speed through cases, providing little opportunity for any but
the most obvious solutions to problems.' If the court's rehabilitation and
treatment missions still have meaning, then there is a gap between inter-
nal systemic norms and the public's conception of how the system should
function.
Since the late nineteenth century, the American public has in fact re-
acted to well-known cases of abuse by demanding greater protection for
child victims.'6 What is less clear is whether public and media attention
can be more than episodic. Press and public attention often follows a
cycle: outrage at a gruesome child abuse death, pressure on politicians to
enact reforms, some move to "clean house" in the juvenile court or child
160. See infra note 164 and accompanying text.
161. See Sherman, supra note 67, at 1845-46.
162. See Trasen, supra note 16, at 382 ("If the public was informed about how the juvenile
system functions-and more importantly, does not function-this might prompt an
'understandable community reaction of outrage and public protest."').
163. See Ainsworth, supra note 8, at 1128.
164. In 1874, the first Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children was established after
the story of eight-year-old Mary Ellen Wilson, an abused foster child, led to public outcry. See
Areen, supra note 73, at 903. "I saw a child brought in, carried in a horse, blanket, at the sight of
which men wept aloud," reporter Jacob Riis wrote of Wilson's entrance in court. Newspapers
printed the child's photograph and accounts of her experiences and condition, and the New York
court removed her from her foster home. See Tracy Thompson and Jane 0. Hansen, ATLANTA
CONST., Sept. 24, 1991, in 1992 House Comm. Hearings, supra note 13, at 185. The link between
widespread media attention to an individual abuse victim, public outcry, and promises of reform
continues. For an example of this pattern playing out in Georgia, see id. at 134-35.
165. See PRESCOTr, supra note 25, at 244 ("The problem is not to attract people's attention
but to maintain public interest in maintaining the basic fairness of our society.").
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welfare agency, and then a lull until the next calamity.166
How does New York's decision to open Family Court and certain
child welfare agency records to the public measure in terms of generating
community norms that lead to sustained reform efforts? An empirical
study of this question is beyond the scope of this paper. However, this
Part presents some mixed evidence about the effect of the new law and
rules. Although the changes have not necessarily led to increased interest
in routine dependency and delinquency matters, they have eased the flow
of information to the press and public in some child death cases that be-
come the focus of intense community scrutiny. Such cases can serve as a
catalyst for re-examination of system-wide policies.
Despite the new family court rules, New York reporters have said
that the frequent continuances, brief hearings, and chaotic nature of the
court make it hard to cover abuse and neglect cases that do not involve
serious crimes or celebrities.16 ' News accounts of judicial reaction to the
new rules have documented few problems but also little additional atten-
tion to routine cases. 6s Child advocates who believe that publicity is not
usually in the best interests of their individual clients have been relieved
that most abuse and neglect cases still go unreported in the press.169 In-
stead, the law has led reporters to gather facts more successfully and
quickly for the kinds of high-voltage stories they usually write. 
170
Press coverage of the deaths of Elisa Izquierdo and Sabrina Green of-
fers one window into how New York laws have begun to function. In No-
vember 1995, New York City police arrested Elisa Izquierdo's mother af-
ter finding the six-year-old's battered and sexually abused body. Elisa
was under the protection of the child welfare system when she died. Her
extended family's account of her life exposed serious errors in how case-
workers and the juvenile court handled her case. Her death became a
symbol of the failings of the New York City child welfare agency.171 Yet
information about Elisa's death trickled rather than flowed onto newspa-
166. See id. at 8-9 (arguing that the press gives disproportionate attention to harrowing tales
of violent juvenile criminals, and often fails to tell the stories of the vast majority of mundane
cases of petty crime and abuse and neglect).
167. See Telephone Interview with David Lewis, reporter, Newsday (May 1, 1998). Lewis
said access remains cumbersome because news organizations must litigate to receive access to
the records of proceedings they have not attended. Lewis also said Elisa's Law has changed the
response of child welfare officials to requests for information when a child dies.
168. See Don Lehman, Open Family Courts Pose Few Problems in First Year, THE GLEN
FALLS POST-STAR, Sept. 2, 1998, at B3.
169. See Interview with Solomon, supra note 14.
170. Lewis said the rule change has been significant. "Before, we weren't allowed into the
Family Court building or into the courtrooms," he said. "It's been a real eye-opener to see what
goes on inside." Interview with Lewis, supra note 167.
171. For example, Elisa's death was featured on the cover of Time Magazine on Dec. 11,
1995. See TIME, Dec. 11, 1995.
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per and magazine pages and television screens. Elisa's caseworker and an
agency supervisor, later fired for their errors, refused to discuss the172
case. And when Kathryn Croft, then head of the Child Welfare Ad-
ministration, was questioned by the New York City Council, she re-
sponded so indirectly to questions that Council members were forced to
repeat themselves several times. Reporters pieced together Elisa's story
from members of her extended family and from leaked internal memos.174
A month elapsed between Elisa's death and a comprehensive newspaper
account of what had happened to her.
7
1
Elisa's case became synonymous with the drawbacks of the New York
Child Welfare Agency's strict confidentiality policy. 76 To some commen-
tators, the privacy interests of a dead child seemed a poor justification for177
secrecy. The case led the New York State Legislature to loosen confi-
dentiality rules. Lawmakers found "unacceptable":
[Laws that] frustrate the ability of the legislature to set informed policy and
act in an appropriate oversight capacity; impair the ability of independent
government agencies to determine the effectiveness of services, staff and
funding; corrode public trust; and undermine the right of the public to deter-
mine whether abused children are being adequately protected.
"Elisa's Law" was enacted in February 1996. In June 1997, the New
York family court issued its revised rules creating a presumption of
openness.
The following November, a nine-year-old girl died under circum-
stances similar to Elisa's death.179 Sabrina Green's body was found with a
fractured skull and a gangrenous severed thumb. Prosecutors charged her
thirty-one-year-old sister and legal guardian, and the sister's boyfriend,
172. See Joe Sexton, Children's Agency Details Errors and Sets Sanctions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
15, 1997, at A25.
173. See Frank Bruni, Child Welfare Chief Is Forced To Testify, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1995,
at B3. Child Welfare Agency head Kathryn Croft was replaced by Nicholas Scoppetta following
Elisa Izquierdo's death. The Child Welfare Agency was renamed the Administration for Chil-
dren's Services.
174. One worker was suspended for talking to the press. This disciplinary action led a fed-
eral judge to strike down a gag rule restricting the speech of city employees. See Lynda Richard-
son, U.S. Judge Strikes Down a Ban on Talking to the Press, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 1996, at B3.
175. See Nina Bernstein & Frank Bruni, Seven Warnings: A Special Report. She Suffered in
Plain Sight but Alarms Were Ignored, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 1995, at Al.
176. See Ian Fisher, Disclosure Laws at Issue After Girl's Death, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1995,
at B8.
177. See, e.g., Editorial Desk, Child Abuse: Theory vs. Reality, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1995, at
A20 (labeling state confidentiality a "handy cover" for bureaucratic bungling).
178. N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 422-a, Legislative Intent of L.1996, c. 12 § 1 (Gould 1997).
179. According to a study by the New York City Public Advocate, 71 children died from
abuse and neglect in 1996 and 78 in 1995. The Public Advocate determined that 15 of the 1996
deaths occurred in cases in which the Administration of Children's Services "failed to monitor
abuse adequately or provide needed services." Vivian S. Toy, Public Advocate Faults Child Wel-
fare Agency in the Deaths of 15, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1997, at B3.
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with manslaughter. Sabrina had by all accounts been well cared for be-
fore going to live with her sister. Her family, like Elisa's, was being moni-
tored by the city's Administration for Children's Services when she died.
With the benefit of Elisa's Law and the revised family court rules, the
press used government and court sources to tell quickly the story of Sa-
brina's death. Within a week, the New York Times had obtained and
quoted in full the transcript of the minutes-long guardianship proceeding
that led a family court judge to place Sabrina in the home of an older sis-
ter who had a history of investigation for neglect and whom he had not
interviewed. The newspaper also recounted the public school system's
failure to make a required home visit when Sabrina did not appear for
the first weeks of the fall term.1'8
In response, politicians and advocates called for specific institutional
reforms. The New York Times noted that the school district's multi-tiered
attendance-tracking system invited malfunction."' New York City
Schools Chancellor Rudy Crew and Administration for Children's Serv-
ices head Nicholas Scoppetta admitted their agencies' failures and
pledged to create a system for information-sharing. 18 The judge who
placed Sabrina with her sister explained how an overburdened family
court system could lead to hasty decisions.'8 3
The calls for reform can be seen as an example of community norms
developed through access to substantive information about one horrific
child death. In this sense, the response to Elisa Izquierdo's death demon-
strates the dovetailing of Justice Brennan's argument for the benefits of
public access and Judith Resnik's more skeptical rationale of enabling the
public to hammer out standards for how courts and government should
work. The norm-generating rationale, however, does not ask about the
burden access places on individuals. Child abuse deaths are rare, and
even when they occur, the privacy interests of siblings and other children
may still be at stake. 84 The problem of individual privacy is the flip side
180. See Joe Sexton & Rachel L. Swarns, Pictures of Sabrina: A Special Report, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 15, 1997, at Al.
181. See Elizabeth Kolbert, Metro Matters: Fine on Paper, Truancy Policy Fails a Child, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 17, 1997, at B1; Editorial Desk, Another Preventable Death, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12,
1997, at A30.
182. Schools Chancellor Crew also sanctioned the principal of the school that had failed to
visit Sabrina's home. See Jacques Steinberg, Crew Seeks To Suspend or Fine Principal for Abuse
Case Delay, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 1997, at B5.
183. Sexton & Swarns, supra note 180, at Al (quoting Judge Terrence J. McElrath as saying:
"I didn't have a lot of information. Given the realities, the bottom line is that you don't always
have all the time or all the information that you would like").
184. See In re Ruben R. v. Daily News, 219 A.D.2d 117 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (holding that
the right of the public and press to attend court proceedings may be overcome by an overriding
interest, in this case evidence setting forth enormous potential harm to the siblings of Elisa
Izquierdo).
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of the Supreme Court's holding in Globe. Had the Court been asked to
grant access to the proceeding in question-the testimony of seventeen
and sixteen-year-old girls about being raped-the Justices might not have
chosen to open the courtroom."' The next Part seeks to develop a set of
factors that judges can use to assess the state's interest in protecting a
child's right to privacy.
IV. KATHERINE B., KEISHA T., AND M.S. REVISITED
A. Interest-balancing: Protecting Children's Privacy
The courts in In re Katherine B., In re Keisha T., and In re M.S.
framed the decision about whether to grant public access as a "balancing
test" between the state's interest in protecting a child's privacy and the
public's interest in obtaining information about the court's work. In
Globe, the Supreme Court proposed a set of factors for judges to consider
in balancing these interests: "the minor victim's age, psychological ma-
turity and understanding, the nature of the crime, the desires of the vic-
tim, and the interests of parents and relatives."'86 Such a set of factors
could help juvenile and family court judges exercise more reasoned dis-
cretion over access decisions. Without them, petitions for access may suc-
ceed or fail simply as a result of a statutory presumption or a judge's
predilections. The courts in In re Katherine B., In re Keisha T., and In re
M.S., for example, considered some factors like those in Globe, but did
not systematically analyze how these factors influenced their decision.'
With additional guidance from legislatures or court rule-making bod-
ies about what factors to consider, judicial discretion might be exercised
along more uniform lines to produce a more consistent body of case law.
185. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 608 (1982). While the Court
struck down Massachusetts's mandatory closure law, it did not require the trial court to open the
rape testimony at issue in the case. Justice Brennan wrote: "if the trial court had been permitted
to exercise its discretion, closure might well have been deemed necessary." Id. at 609. Through
their lawyer, the girls told the judge that they did not object to opening the courtroom as long as
the press would agree not to interview them or to publish their names and photographs. See id.
at 599 n.5.
186. Id. at 608 (footnotes omitted). The first three factors inject content and specificity into
the "best interests of the child" standard that courts use to adjudicate dependency and some de-
linquency cases. See GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 68, at 50 (defining best interests as making
paramount the needs of the child to be placed); Peters, supra note 68, at 1514-16 (discussing best
interests as the looming legal standard).
187. For example, the appeals court in In re Katherine B. approvingly quoted dicta from an-
other jurisdiction claiming a greater right to privacy by abused rather than delinquent children,
but did not explain why this should apply under New York law. See In re Katherine B., 189
A.D.2d at 449. The court in In re M.S. cited the New York Family Court Rules, which concern
the operation of the court, the parties' objections, and the need to protect the child from harm.
But it did not consider them in terms of Malcolm's psychological problems. See In re M.S., 662
N.Y.S.2d 207, 210 (Fam. Ct. 1997).
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In re Katherine B. and In re Keisha T. indicate that some judges fill the
gap left by current laws by developing their own set of factors. In re M.S.
suggests that they do not always do so. To gain a better understanding of
how this idea can be put into practice, this Part reconsiders In re Kather-
ine B., In re Keisha T, and In re M.S. in light of the factors outlined in
Globe and Part I.8 1 will also explore the interaction between the factors
and the potential for norm-generation and expression that public access
to information brings. The New York Family Court rules governing ac-
cess would allow-though not require-judges to open or close their
courtrooms based on an analysis of the Globe factors. Under California
law, however, a meaningful analysis of the same factors would be
precluded by the strong presumption of closure. I argue that this varia-
tion measures how receptive each state is to the value of generating and
expressing community norms, the public's role as audience, and Justice
Brennan's checks-and-balances rationale.
B. Interest-Balancing: A Trial Run
In In re Katherine B., the Suffolk Family Court could have begun by
considering Katherine's relatively young age, medical evidence of her
vulnerability to "revictimization," and her desire for a closed hearing.
The court could then have weighed the type of proceeding at issue: a
hearing about whether Katherine should remain in foster care or return
to her mother following the kidnapping and sexual abuse. Next, the court
could have discussed the type of access: coverage by three major televi-
sion networks and several newspapers.
On the other hand, in weighing the public's right to obtain informa-
tion, the court could have viewed the case in light of norm-generation.
The court could have explored the case's potential to inform the public
about child sexual abuse, foster care for dependent teenagers, and paren-
tal responsibility for crimes committed by other adults. The court also
could have considered whether allowing for press and public access
would help the public determine the adequacy and appropriateness of
family court procedures for adjudicating cases like Katherine's.
Under New York's law, the presumption in favor of access would
have led the court to give weight to this second set of considerations. But
the Family Court rules do not demand that every dependency proceeding
be opened. The 1997 rule revisions would still allow the appeals court to
find for closure based on Katherine's objection and the need to protect
her from harm. Yet New York's rules do not require judges to consider
188. Although the set of factors I develop comes from In re Katherine B. and In re Keisha T.
as well as Globe, I will refer to them as the Globe factors.
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these factors. As a result, they allow for decisions like that of the Family
Court in In re Katherine B., which opened the court despite substantial
reasons-intense media attention, sensitive sexual abuse charges, and
Katherine's affidavit-for finding that the balancing test between privacy
and access weighed on the side of closure. In addition, the absence of
formal factors in the rules led the appeals court to base its decision in part
on the assertion that dependent children have a greater right to privacy
than delinquent children. This assertion does not reflect New York law,
which seeks to rehabilitate non-serious juvenile offenders and adjudicates
their cases in Family Court with dependency cases. The New York Fam-
ily Court rules must set forth clear factors, like those in Globe, to ensure
that judicial reasoning follows a consistent step-by-step analysis, matches
New York's rehabilitative focus for non-serious offenders, and ade-
quately protects the child's interest in privacy.
The California statute governing access presents a more basic prob-
lem. In California, a court's approach to the access petition in In re Kath-
erine B. could not turn on an analysis of a set of factors like those in
Globe. Instead, a California court necessarily would have found for clo-
sure because the state's statute does not allow for the possibility that the
public may have a direct and legitimate interest in a dependency pro-
ceeding. While in Katherine's case a closed hearing is the preferred out-
come, the statute is flawed because it precludes California courts from
considering any access petition in terms of the value of disseminating in-
formation to the public for the purpose of norm-generation and expres-
sion.
In summary, both New York and California courts deciding In re
Katherine B. might have issued the same ruling in favor of closure. But
New York court rules do not require judges to consider the Globe factors
that would help them think through the state's interest in protecting a
child's privacy. The California statute, on the other hand, does not allow
courts meaningfully to take into account the public's right to obtain in-
formation.
In re Keisha T. provides an example of a case in which the public's
right to information might outweigh the factors in favor of privacy. The
juvenile court judge deciding In re Keisha T. could have begun by consid-
ering the ages and maturity levels of the ten children whose files the Bee
reporter asked to review. The appeals court opinion does not provide any
information about the children, but notes that the children's lawyers ob-
jected to the Bee's petition with the support of the county Department of
Health and Human Services. These objections and the court's knowledge
of the children's circumstances could have been considered in light of an-
other Globe factor: the type of access being requested. In contrast to the
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intense media scrutiny at stake in In re Katherine B., the files were to be
used for a series of articles on the failures of the county child welfare sys-
tem by the Sacramento Bee, a single regional newspaper. The paper
agreed not to disclose the names of the children, who had not been the
subject of other publicity. 189
Next the court could have considered In re Keisha T.'s potential to
allow the public to generate and express norms. Reading the children's
files might have allowed the Bee to assess better systemic problems in the
county child welfare system. That understanding might lead to an article
that pushed beyond case-by-case accounts of the three deaths that pre-
cipitated the initial inquiry. Such an article in turn might have helped the
public to evaluate how the child welfare system was working. In this case,
therefore, consideration of the Globe factors weighs in favor of granting
access.
It is at least possible that a Bee series based on access to the In re Kei-
sha T files also would have aided the public in expressing norms. There is
some evidence that news organizations with access to facts like those in
the In re Keisha T. files can produce deeper coverage, and that this cov-
erage can lead to more useful public involvement. 190 Perhaps readers of a
Bee series using the In re Keisha T. files would be better equipped to ex-
press their view of how abuse and neglect cases should be handled, and
whether existing agency practices followed this norm.
Under California law, however, the juvenile court in In re Keisha T.
could not have pursued this line of inquiry into norm-generation and ex-
pression and allowed the Bee access to the files. The appeals court ruling
stated that accommodation of press requests for information should take
into account "whether adequate information can be obtained from other
sources."' 9' The California statute further bars access without consent
from a child and parent or guardian. I did not find a California case in
which a court allowed press access to a dependency proceeding.192 Be-
cause even the anonymous and limited access envisioned by the In re Kei-
sha T. lower court falls outside the lines drawn by the California statutes,
this case exemplifies the shortcomings of California's approach.' 93 Had
189. In re Keisha T., 38 Cal. App. 4th 220, 226 (1995).
190. See supra Section III.D.
191. In re Keisha T., 38 Cal. App. 4th at 240.
192. See, e.g., San Bernardino County Dep't of Social Services v. Superior Court, 232 Cal.
App. 3d 188 (1991) (holding that there is no constitutional right of public access to juvenile court
proceedings, and finding the Richmond-Globe test of access too constraining for adequate con-
sideration of a child's interests in closure); In re Jesse McM., 105 Cal. App. 3d 187 (1980)
(holding that a minor does not have an absolute constitutional right to a public trial in juvenile
court).
193. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 827. (West 1998).
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the case been decided in New York, however, a family court judge could
have given weight to the public awareness benefits argued for by the Bee.
The judge could also have considered the objections of In re Keisha T's
lawyers and the child welfare agency. But again, New York's revised
court rules can produce cursory or misdirected analysis becaue they do
not require such a consideration.
In summary, a New York court deciding In re Keisha T. might have
opened the files while a California court would have been likely to close
them. Under New York's rules, the court's analysis might or might not
have taken into account the children's wishes, as expressed through their
lawyers. California's statute strictly limits how courts can take into ac-
count the values of norms expression and generation.
An analysis of In re M.S. demonstrates how the Globe test could work
in a case of a petition for access to a juvenile delinquency proceeding.
The Family Court judge deciding whether to grant the New York Daily
News petition for access to Malcolm Shabazz's arson hearing could have
begun by considering Malcolm's age of twelve and his level of maturity
and understanding. Attention to age and understanding would allow the
judge to consider how media access might affect Malcolm as an emotion-
ally disturbed teenager. If the court did not feel equipped to answer this
question on its own, it could have solicited psychiatric testimony from the
doctors treating Malcolm. Next, the court could have considered the type
of access being requested: coverage by several television and radio net-
works and large newspapers. Finally, the court could have weighed
whether Malcolm's status as a delinquent accused of a serious crime less-
ened the state's interest in protecting his privacy.
In considering In re M.S. in terms of its potential to aid in generating
and expressing community norms, the court could have noted the sub-
stantial public response to the death of Malcolm's grandmother. Did the
public's response seem confined to the family tragedy, or could it lead to
broader inquiry into, for example, treatment efforts on behalf of emo-
tionally disturbed children like Malcolm? The court also could have con-
sidered the public's interest in understanding how the juvenile court han-
dles such cases. Granting access might allow the public to examine its
norms about rehabilitation for juvenile offenders with psychological
problems and about protecting the community from such offenders.
New York court rules and law provide for some but not all of this
analysis. The judge considered Malcolm's objections to access. But the
New York rules do not require judges to assess for themselves a child's
level of maturity or understanding and thus weigh the effects of publicity
on a child with emotional problems. As a result the Family Court judge
faulted Malcolm's lawyers for failing to submit evidence supporting their
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opposition to publicity, but made no independent inquiry into the merits
of Malcolm's objection to press access on the basis of its effect on his
emotional well-being.
New York law permits the judge's distinction between some delin-
quents as less deserving of privacy protection and dependents, since it
treats some serious juvenile offenders differently from lesser offenders.1 94
However, Malcolm did not come under the serious-offender category be-
cause his case had been transferred from adult court to Family Court. 9"
As a result, there is no basis under New York law for according the state
a lesser interest in protecting Malcolm's privacy interest than in protect-
ing the interests of dependents and minor delinquents. Yet neither the
court rules nor state statute explicitly address this question, leaving
judges deciding access petitions free to draw lines between different kinds
of delinquents as they see fit. The rules also do not address the type of
access factor, beyond suggesting that judges consider the "orderly and
sound administration of justice" in making their determinations. While
New York's presumption of openness requires consideration of the case's
potential to build public awareness, the state's approach does not suffi-
ciently protect the lesser delinquent's interest in privacy. The decision
about whether to grant press access in In re M.S. is a closer question than
the New York rules require courts to recognize. The judge making this
decision should have asked Malcolm's psychiatrist to testify and consid-
ered the sensationalized nature of much of the coverage of Malcolm's
crime before deciding to allow reporters into the courtroom.
Had In re M.S. been heard in California, by contrast, consideration of
the Globe factors would have been irrelevant to the court's ruling. Cali-
fornia law requires public trials for juveniles accused of arson. The law
thus dictates that for juvenile offenders like Malcolm, the values of norm-
generation and expression must outweigh the state's interest in protecting
a child's privacy. The law does not mention exceptions for children with
emotional problems or other vulnerabilities.
In summary, a New York court and a California court might have
both ruled in favor of openness in In re M.S. But in New York the judge
might or might not have taken into account a child's objection and the
need to protect the child from harm. In California, the law does not allow
for such nuances.
CONCLUSION
Judges deciding whether to open proceedings in dependency and de-
194. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
195. See N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 180.75.
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linquency cases face competing claims. On the one hand, each case may
give the public insight into how the child welfare and court systems work.
On the other hand, each case involves personal facts about which one can
easily understand the need or desire for privacy. The courts in In re Kath-
erine B., In re Keisha T., and In re M.S. framed this choice as a balancing
test between the public's interest in obtaining information and the state's
interest in protecting the privacy of a dependent or delinquent child. This
Note has explored the history and arguments behind the balancing test by
asking two questions: How successfully has the state rehabilitated and
protected delinquent and dependent children under a closed court sys-
tem? How successfully have the press and public been involved in the
handling of juvenile and family court cases? The answers on both fronts
are mixed and ambiguous.
The juvenile court founders believed confidentiality would help shield
children from stigma. They designed an informal courtroom so that
judges could exercise discretion for the good of the children who came
before them. But the juvenile justice and child welfare systems in many
ways did not live up to their founders' aspirations. Their well-
documented shortcomings provide ample support for the argument that
confidentiality rules help prop up a malfunctioning bureaucracy by
shielding courts and agencies from accountability.
Still, most attempts to reform the juvenile court have stopped short of
opening it to the public. The Supreme Court in Gault and McKeiver did
not give juveniles the right to a public trial because it did not want to
abandon the court's rehabilitative mission. Out of concern for the privacy
interests of the victims of child abuse and neglect and their parents, Con-
gress also emphasized confidentiality in passing the 1974 Child Abuse
and Prevention Act. Disclosure bans, however, have proven to be a
mixed blessing. Some child advocates found that CAPTA-imposed state
restrictions prevented collaboration among the lawyers, police, teachers,
and social service workers involved in a child's case. Their frustration led
Congress to loosen CAPTA's disclosure ban in 1992 and 1996. At the
same time, Congress opened child welfare agency records to citizen re-
view panels and instructed states to provide limited information to the
public in cases in which children die or nearly die.
New York has taken the next step by making dependency and delin-
quency proceedings presumptively open. Open courtrooms disturb some
child advocates who worry that laws like New York's place children's pri-
vacy at risk. Even the most sensitive press accounts probe and expose.
They seek not to heal, but to account for what has happened and why.
The public is not a contained group participating in the system, and it
may react to an abused child's story with a mix of horror, concern, mis-
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understanding, indifference, or scorn.
Exposure in individual cases may seem gratuitous given that the press
and the public have not focused in a sustained way on the vast majority of
dependency and delinquency cases. Yet proponents of open courts can
point to moments when the public has snapped to attention, often when it
learns that a child presumed to be under the care of the child welfare sys-
tem has died. In the case of Sabrina Green, public attention translated
into some "watchdog" oversight of the child welfare and school systems.
Continuing calls for better system-wide monitoring and ongoing account-
ability support the claim that open courts can help lead to reform, at least
in some cases."'
The link between support for open delinquency proceedings and
harsher punishment for juvenile criminals further complicates the ques-
tion of support for public access. As news outlets begin to publish the
names and photographs of children accused of serious crimes, the faith
placed by Justice Brennan (in McKeiver) in the public to respond to the
plight of juvenile miscreants has come to seem misplaced. California's
statute underscores this point by carving out an open-court exception
only for serious juvenile offenders. The state takes the position that clo-
sure will facilitate rehabilitation, and openness will punish. For the same
reason, California continues to draw a bright line in dependency cases be-
tween increased professional access and public access.
New York, by contrast, presumes that the public has a significant in-
terest in Family Court matters. The revised New York Family Court rules
treat juvenile and family court as a site of public narrative. The rules also
recognize that children and their families have an interest in privacy and
authorize judges and child welfare officials to protect that privacy when
necessary. But under New York's approach, the child's privacy interest
does not always (or even often) outweigh the public's interest in being in-
formed. New York courts thus frame their decisions to open the court-
room in terms of the Richmond and Globe principle that the public has a
right to know about what happens in court. At the same time, treatment
and rehabilitation remain the state's goals for dependent and lesser de-
linquent children. By allowing public access to coexist with these goals,
New York takes the position that public access is in some circumstances
compatible with a child's best interests.
Opening the courts entails a normative shift away from an informal
juvenile court with unbounded judicial intervention and toward fixed
196. See Rachel L. Swarns, Finding Common Ground on Child Welfare, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6,
1998, at A49 (describing the creation of an expert panel to monitor child welfare agency reform
in New York City that resolved years-long litigation brought in the wake of Elisa Izquierdo's
death).
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standards and public oversight. As they increasingly lose faith that the
state will do what is best, access advocates have turned to the public as
another line of defense for children's interests. This view of the juvenile
and family courts gives the public a monitoring role to play. By barring
public access to all delinquency and dependency proceedings, legislatures
and courts inhibit the public's ability to serve as watchdog. This viewpoint
accords with the checks-and-balances rationale of Richmond and Globe.
Another more skeptical view is that public access to the courtroom will
enable the larger community to generate and express norms about what
takes place in courts, even if these norms do not necessarily impose
higher standards on the juvenile justice and child welfare systems.
Under a law that allows for some disclosure, the question facing
courts and policy makers becomes how decisions about closure should be
made. In New York, the legislature asks judges to exercise their discre-
tion with a presumption toward granting access. In California, lawmakers
cut off judicial analysis by virtually mandating closure for dependents and
some delinquents and mandating access for serious juvenile offenders.
For different reasons, then, the California and New York statutes share a
weakness: they do not ensure rigorous, case-by-case analysis of under-
lying issues. Setting forth a set of factors like those in Globe-child's age,
maturity, type of proceeding, type of access, and child's wishes-would
ensure that judges exercise their discretion within a structured, thought-
out framework. New York could make this improvement by incorporat-
ing a set of standards into its existing court rules. California would have
to reconsider its strong presumptions in favor of closure for dependents
and access for serious delinquents to make room for meaningful judicial
analysis of a set of standards like those in Globe.
To elicit better reasoned and more nuanced rulings about openness
and closure, New York legislators and rule-makers should require judges
to consider a set of factors like those in Globe. The New York Family
Court rules could be expanded to encourage more thorough analysis, and
judges could be instructed, rather than permitted, to consider them. Such
a requirement would be consistent with New York's presumption in favor
of open courtrooms, while at the same time help judges develop common
precedent and focus on the individual child before them. It would dis-
courage outcomes like the lower court decision granting access in In re
Katherine B. despite troubling facts about sexual abuse and a child's
heart-wrenching plea for closure. And it would also discourage decisions
like In re M.S., in which access is granted without sufficient consideration
of the factors weighing toward closure. These examples of routine deci-
sions granting access suggest that New York judges often do not consider
systematically their reasons for opening or closing a particular case. In-
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corporating the Globe factors into the family court rules would address
this weakness.
Lawmakers who choose to emphasis privacy over public access, as in
California, must moderate their approach if they are to allow the public
to generate and express community norms. Pro-closure statutes can re-
quire judges to think through the competing privacy and access issues at
stake in a particular case only if they create some window for recognizing
the public and press as legitimate observers. The appellate court's reluc-
tance to allow for the limited, anonymous access requested in In re Kei-
sha T. demonstrates the lack of such a window in the current California
statute. States that presume in favor of closure should rethink their ap-
proach to embrace, at least under some circumstances, the values of pub-
lic norm-expression and generation. By shifting in this direction, they can
then set forth standards to guide judicial reasoning, and thus provide ju-
venile and family courts with a more effective mechanism for resolving
the complicated and case-specific issues that inevitably surround petitions
for access.
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